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Breed v. Jones: Double Jeopardy and the Juvenile

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: ". . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb . . . ." This is better
known as the Double Jeopardy Clause which the United States Supreme Court, in Benton v. Maryland,1 made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. The protection against being
placed in jeopardy twice has generally been provided to defendants
in proceedings which are essentially criminal; 2 whether or not a
juvenile is entitled to the same protection within the juvenile process is a question which was resolved by the United States Supreme
Court in Breed v. Jones.8
In Breed, Gary Steven Jones, a juvenile 17 years of age, had a
petition filed against him in the Los Angeles County Juvenile
Court, which alleged that, while armed with a deadly weapon, he
4
committed acts which would have constituted the crime of robbery
if committed by an adult. The petition further alleged that because
of such acts Jones was a person within the purview of California
Welfare and Institutions Code Section 602.5 Subsequently, a detention hearing 6 was held in which Jones was ordered detained pend1. 395 U.S. 784 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Benton].
2. See Helverig v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1938) [hereinafter
cited as Mitchell]; United States v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1943)
[hereinafter cited as Hess].
3. 421 U.S. 519 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Breed].
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 211 (West 1970) which provides:
Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against
his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.
5. 421 U.S. at 521. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 602 (West Supp.
1975) which provides:
Any person who is under the age of 18 years when he violates any
law of this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any
city or county of this state defining crime or who, after having been
found by the juvenile court a person described by Section 601, fails

to obey any lawful order of the juvenile court, is within the juris-

diction of the juvenile court, which may adjudge such person to
be a ward of the court.
6.

See

CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE

§ 632 (West 1972) which provides:

Unless sooner released, a minor taken into custody under the provisions of this article shall be brought before a judge or referee of

ing a jurisdictional hearing 7 on the Section 602 petition. At the
jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court found that the allegations
in the petition were true and declared Jones a ward of the court.
The court continued the proceedings for a dispositional hearing.8
Jones was ordered detained during the interim.
the juvenile court for a hearing (which shall be referred to as a
'detention hearing') to determine whether the minor shall be
further detained as soon as possible but in any event before the
expiration of the next judicial day after a petition to declare such
minor a ward or dependent child has been filed. If the minor is
not brought before a judge or referee of the juvenile court within
the period prescribed by this section he shall be released from
custody.
7. 421 U.S. at 521. The jurisdictional hearing (sometimes referred to
as the "adjudicatory hearing") is described in Goldfarb and Little, 1961
California Juvenile Court Law: Effective Uniform Standards for Juvenile
Court Procedures, 51 CALiF. L. REV. 421, at 442 (1963), as follows:
j T]he adjudicatory hearing essentially is a bifurcated hearing.
irst, the court determines the 'jurisdictional question' of whether
the minor is a person described by sections 600, 601, or 602 of the
California Welfare and Institutions Code. If the court finds that
it has jurisdiction, then it proceeds to a consideration of the proper
disposition to be made of the minor.
The jurisdictional hearing is desicribed in CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 701
(West 1975):
At the hearing, the court shall first consider only the question
whether the minor is a person described by Sections 600, 601, or
602, and for this purpose, any matter or information relevant and
material to the circumstances or acts which are alleged to bring
him within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is admissible and
may be received in evidence; however, proof beyond a reasonable
doubt supported by evidence, legally admissible in the trial of
criminal cases, must be adduced to support a finding that the minor
is a person described by Section 602, and a preponderence of evidence, legally admissible in the trial of civil cases must be adduced
to support a finding that the minor is a person described by Section
600 or 601. When it appears that the minor has made an extrajudicial admission or confession and denies the same at the hearing,
the court may continue the hearing for not to exceed 7 days to enable the probation officer to subpoena witnesses to attend the hearing to prove the allegations of the petition. If the minor is not
represented by counsel at the hearing, it shall be deemed that objections that could have been made to the evidence were made.
8. 421 U.S. at 522. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 702 (West 1972)
which provides:
After hearing such evidence, the court shall make a finding, noted
in the minutes of the court, whether or not the minor is a person
described by Sections 600, 601, or 602. If it finds that the minor
is not such a person, it shall order that the petition be dismissed
and the minor be discharged from any detention or restriction
theretofore ordered. If the court finds that the minor is such a person, it shall make and enter its findings and order accordingly and
shall then proceed to hear evidence on the question of proper disposition to be made of the minor. Prior to doing so, it may continue the hearing, if necessary, to receive the social study report
of the probation officer or to receive other evidence on its own motion or the motion of a parent or guardian for not to exceed 10
judicial days if the minor is detained pending such continuance, and
if the minor is not detained, it may continue the hearing to a date
not later than 30 days after the date of filing of the petition. The
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Fifteen days later, the court conducted a hearing in which it indicated its intention to find Jones ".

.

. 'not.

.

.amenable to the care,

treatment and training program available through the facilities of
the juvenile court' under California Welfare and Institutions Code
Section 707." 9 Jones's counsel requested a continuance on the
ground of surprise. A continuance was granted for one week, at
the conclusion of which a fitness hearing 0 was held. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court declared Jones ". . . 'unfit for
treatment as a juvenile' . . . ." and bound him over to the criminal

court to be prosecuted as an adult.'1
court may, for good cause shown continue the hearing for an additional 15 days, if the minor is not detained. The court may make
such order for detention of the minor or his release from detention,
during the period of the continuance, as is appropriate.
9. 421 U.S. at 523. See Stats. 1961, c. 1616, p. 3485 § 2, as amended
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §

707 (West Supp. 1975) which provides:

At any time during a hearing upon a petition alleging that a minor
is, by reason of violation of any criminal statute or ordinance, a
person described in Section 602, when substantial evidence has been
adduced to support a finding that the minor was 16 years of age
or older at the time of the alleged commission of such offense and
that the minor would not be amenable to the care, treatment and
training program available through the facilities of the juvenile
court, or if, at any time after such hearing, a minor who was 16
years of age or older at the time of the commission of an offense
and who was committed therefor by the court to the Youth Authority, is returned to the court by the Youth Authority pursuant to
Sections 780 or 1737.1, the court may make a finding noted in the
minutes that the minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt
with under this chapter, and the court shall direct the district attorney or other appropriate prosecuting officer to prosecute the person
under the applicable criminal statute or ordinance and thereafter
dismiss the petition or, if a prosecution has been commenced in another court but has been suspended while juvenile court proceedings are held, shall dismiss the petition and issue its order directing
that the other court proceedings resume. In determining whether
the minor is a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under this
chapter, the offense, in itself, shall not be sufficient to support a
finding that such minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt
with under the provisions of the Juvenile Court Law. A denial
by the person on whose behalf the petition is brought of any or
all of the facts or conclusions set forth therein or of any inference

to be drawn therefrom is not, of itself, sufficient to support a find-

ing that such person is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with
under the provisions of the Juvenile Court Law.
10. "Fitness hearing" is the term sometimes used when referring to a
hearing held under CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 707 (West Supp. 1975).
It derives from the terminology in that section which provides:
[T]he court may make a finding . . . that the minor is not a fit
and proper subject to be dealt with under this chapter ....

11. 421 U.S. at 524.

Jones stood trial in the adult criminal system and was found "...
guilty of robbery in the first degree under California Penal Code
Section 211 (a) 1 2 and ordered . . . committed to the California
Youth Authority.""' No appeal was taken.
After a few months, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was
filed in the United States District Court for the Central District
of California, 1 4 alleging that the transfer under Section 707 and subsequent trial placed Jones in double jeopardy. The District Court
denied the petition,' 5 but such denial was reversed by the Federal
Court of Appeals.' 0 The state then sought review by the United
17
States Supreme Court which granted certiorari.
The issue presented to the Supreme Court for its determination
was whether or not a juvenile should be afforded the protection
of the Fifth Amendment against twice being "placed in jeopardy"
where the juvenile is processed through a jurisdictional hearing in
the juvenile system, declared a ward of the court, and subsequently
transferred to the adult criminal system where he is tried and convicted for the same offense.
12. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 211 (a) (West 1970) which provides:
All robbery which is perpetrated by torture or by a person being
armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon and the robbery of any
person who is performing his duties as operator of any motor vehicle, streetcar, or trackless trolley used for the transportation of
persons for hire, is robbery in the first degree. All other kinds of
robbery are of the second degree.
13. 421 U.S. at 525.
14. Jones v. Breed, 343 F. Supp. 690 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
15. Id. at 692. The District Court, in denying the petition, reasoned as
follows:
The distinction between the preliminary procedures and hearings
provided by California Law for Juveniles and a criminal trial are
many and apparent and the effort of petitioner to relate them is
unconvincing. However, even assuming jeopardy attached during
the preliminary juvenile proceedings, and further assuming all
rights constitutionally assured to an adult accused of crime are to
be enforced and made available to a juvenile. It is clear that no
new jeopardy arose by the juvenile proceedings sending the case
to the criminal court. Such transfer neither acquitted nor convicted
and could not in any event represent a second trial for the same
offense or more than a continuing jeopardy for a single offense.
[emphasis supplied]
16. Jones v. Breed, 497 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1974). The Court of Appeals,
in concluding that the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of protection against
double jeopardy is applicable to juveniles within the juvenile process, made
the following statement:
Applying double jeopardy protection to juvenile proceedings will
not impede the juvenile courts in carrying out their basic goal of
rehabilitating the erring youth. Indeed, basic constitutional guarantees such as that against double jeopardy are so fundamental to
our notions of fairness that our refusal to find them applicable to
the youth may do irreparable harm to or destroy their confidence
in our judicial system. Jones v. Breed, supra at 1165.
17. Breed, 421 U.S. at 527.
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Historically, the establishment of the New York House of Refuge
in 1853 and the institution of the juvenile court by the Illinois Legislature in 1899 marked the first two great humanitarian efforts
in juvenile reform.' 8 The third was initiated by the United States
Supreme Court in In re Gault.19 In Gault, the Court held that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution applied to the juvenile"process and, in
particular, to the adjudicative stage of determining the delinquency
of a juvenile who allegedly is in violation of a criminal statute.
The Court specifically afforded juveniles the constitutional guarantees of the right to notice of the charges, the right to counsel, the
right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and the
privilege against self-incrimination. 20 However, the Court did not
provide juveniles with all criminal procedural guarantees which are
afforded adults. Despite this fact, the Court affirmatively held
that juveniles must be afforded those constitutoinal rights which
are necessary to guarantee them "fundamental fairness" within the
juvenile process.

21

What are those constitutional rights and how are they to be determined? The Supreme Court, beginning with Gault and with its
subsequent decisions in In re Winship22 and McKiever v. Pennsylvania,23 developed an approach to resolving such questions.
In re Winship presented the Court with the question of whether
or not ".

.

. juveniles, like adults, are constitutionally entitled to

proof beyond a reasonable doubt when charged with violation of
a criminal law. ' 24 The Court held that juveniles are constitutionally entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt in such a case and
expressed the view that its holding would not adversely affect the
unique characteristicsof the juvenile court system:
Use of the reasonable-doubt standard during the adjudicatory hearing will not disturb New York policies that a finding that a child
has violated a criminal law does not constitute a criminal convic18. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22
L. REV. 1187 (1970).
19. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Gault].
20. See id. at 38, 41, 56-57.

21. Id. at 13.

22. 397 U.S. 358 (1970)

23. 402 U.S. 538 (1971)
24. 397 U.S. at 365.

[hereinafter cited as Winship].

[hereinafter cited as McKiever].

STAN.

tion, that such a finding does not deprive the child of his civil
rights, and that the juvenile proceedings are confidential. Nor will
there be any effect on the informality, flexibility, or speed of the
hearing at which the factfinding takes place. And the opportunity
during the post adjudicatory or dispositional hearing for a wideranging review of the child's social history and for his individualized treatment will remain unimpaired. Similarly, there will be
no effect on the procedures distinctive to juvenile proceedings that
are employed prior to the adjudicatory hearing. 25 [emphasis
added]

In McKiever v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court considered the
question of whether or not a jury trial is constitutionally required
in juvenile proceedings in order to preserve "fundamental fairness"
to the juvenile within the juvenile process. The Court concluded
that ". . if the jury trial were to be injected into the system as
a matter of right, it would bring with it into that system the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the public trial."26 The Court held that a jury
trial was not a constitutional right necessary to preserve fundamental fairness to juveniles within the juvenile process.
A close analysis of the Gault, Winship and McKiever opinions
reveals that the Court has developed a three-prong approach in determining what constitutional rights are necessary to guarantee
juveniles "fundamental fairness" within the juvenile process. The
Court addresses itself to three basic issues: First, what the underlying purpose of the constitutional right in question is; second,
whether that right is required in juvenile proceedings; and third,
and most importantly, whether the requirement of the constitutional right in question will detrimentally impede the beneficial aspects of the juvenile system. A factor considered in determining
this last issue is the recommendation of various studies and model
acts dealing with the juvenile court system indicating the extent
to which the right has already been made applicable to delinquency
proceedings in the various states, whether by statute or court decision. 27 This same approach appears to be the one applied by the
Court in Breed.
Citing Benton v. Maryland,28 the Court held that Jones was entitled to full protection against twice being placed in jeopardy after
his transfer from the juvenile court, that he was "put in jeopardy"
by the proceedings in the adult criminal court and that the ".
25. Id. at 366.
26. 402 U.S. at 551.

27. Rudstein, Double Jeopardy in Juvenile Proceedings,14 WM. & MARY

L. REv. 226, 275 (1972)

[hereinafter cited as Double Jeopardy in Juvenile

Proceedings].
28. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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petition filed in juvenile court and the information filed in Superior Court related to the 'same offence' within the meaning of the
,,29
constitutional prohibition ....
With the facts and the above conclusions established, the Court's
basic question for determination was whether or not Jones was "put
in jeopardy" by reason of the jurisdictionalhearingwithin the juve-

nile process. 0

If so, then Jones was placed in double jeopardy by

reason of his subsequent trial in the adult criminal system; there-

fore, his case would have to be dismissed. At the foundation of
this question was the constitutional issue of whether or not the
Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy applies to
juveniles within the juvenile process. To determine this question,
the Court applied its three-prong approach which it had developed
in Gault, Winship and McKiever.
The first question addressed by the Court was: "What is the underlying purpose of the constitutional protection against twice
being placed in jeopardy?" In determining this question, the Court
relied upon some of its earlier holdings which dealt with the issue
of double jeopardy within the adult criminal system. In Price v.
Georgia,31 the Court stated:
The 'twice put in jeopardy' language of the Constitution . . . relates
to a potential, i.e., the risk that an accused for the second time will

be convicted
for the 'same offense' for which he was initially
32
tried.

The Court went on to cite Green v. United States,3 3 in which it
stated, while discussing the purpose behind the Double Jeopardy
Clause:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all
its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as
well as enhancing
the possibility that even though innocent he may
be found guilty.3 4

29. Breed, 421 U.S. at 527.
30. Id.

31. 398 U.S. 323 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Price].
32. Id. at 326.

33. 355 U.S. 184 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Green].
34. Id. at 187.

The Court continued by relying on United States v. Jorn,a5 in which
case the Court set forth the policy underlying the Double Jeopardy
Clause when it stated:
The Fifth Amendment prohibition against placing a defendant
twice in jeopardy represents a constitutional policy of finality for
the defendant's benefit in federal criminal proceedings.36
In summary, it appears that the underlying purpose of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, as viewed by the Court, is to prevent the accused
from having to undergo the risk of experiencing the physiological
trauma, stress, embarrassment and expense of a criminal trial twice
for the same offense. The Court seems to qualify such purpose
in the name of "finality" in criminal proceedings.
Once having determined the underlying purpose of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, the Court directed itself next to the issue of
whether or not a juvenile should have a right to such protection
within the juvenile process. In addressing this issue, the Court
noted that the Double Jeopardy Clause pertains only to proceedings
which are essentially criminal;8 7 but in so doing, it referred to its
holding in Gault where, in discussing the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, it stated:
[J]uvenile proceedings to determine 'delinquency' which may lead
to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as 'criminal'
for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination. To hold
otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the feeble
enticement of the 'civil' label-of-convenience
which has been at8
tached to juvenile proceedings.3
The Court continued by implying that because of its holding in
Gault, Winship and McKiever, which implemented the requirement
of "fundamental fairness" within the juvenile process, juvenile
hearings have been prolonged, and burdens incident to a juvenile's
defense have increased. 9 As a result, juvenile proceedings "...
engender elements of 'anxiety and insecurity' in a juvenile and impose a heavy personal strain. '40 To support this finding, the Court
quoted from Gault, noting that the label of "delinquency" upon a
juvenile carries only slightly less stigma than the term "criminal"
as applied to adults, and ". . . where the issue is whether a child
will be found to be 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his
35. 400 U.S. 470 (1971).

36. Id. at 479-480.
37. Breed, 421 U.S. at 528, citing Helverig v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 39899 (1938); United States v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1943).
38. 387 U.S. at 49-50.
39. Breed, 421 U.S. at 530.
40. Id., citing Green, 355 U.S. at 187.
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liberty for years [the gravity] is comparable in seriousness to a
felony prosecution. ' 41 The Court went on to state that ". . . in
terms of potential consequences, there is little to distinguish an ad'42
judicatory hearing . . . from a traditional criminal prosecution;
therefore, the right against being placed twice in jeopardy as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment should be applicable to the juvenile process. The Court held that Jones was put "in jeopardy" at
the instance he was ". . . put to trial before the trier of facts, . . .
that is, when the juvenile court, as the trier of facts, began to hear
'43
evidence.
From the above it appears that the Court found no distinction
between the risks and consequences to which a juvenile is exposed
during a jurisdictional hearing and those to which an adult is exposed during a criminal trial; it found the same standards of double
jeopardy apply equally to juveniles and adults in their respective
systems. However, such a holding would require that a juvenile
be processed through a fitness hearing prior to any jurisdictional
hearing, because once a juvenile court begins to hear evidence in
the jurisdictional hearing the juvenile will be considered placed "in
jeopardy", and any subsequent transfer and criminal trial would
amount to "double jeopardy".
In keeping with its approach as developed in Gault, Winship and
McKiever, the Court in Breed balanced the state's interests against
the juvenile's interests in deciding the third issue of the three-prong
approach, that is, whether or not the constitutional right will detrimentally impede the beneficial aspects of the juvenile system.
The juvenile's interest, as viewed by the Court, was that of being
free from undergoing the trauma, burdens and expense of a second
criminal trial on the same charge or charges. The Court labeled
the state's interest as that of the availability of a procedure
whereby it could transfer an unamenable juvenile to the adult system. In balancing the above interests, it considered the effect its
44
holding might conceivably have upon the juvenile process.
41. Breed, 421 U.S. at 530, citing Winship, 397 U.S. at 366.
42. Breed, 421 U.S. at 530. See Green, 355 U.S. at 187.
43. Breed, 421 U.S. at 531.
44. Id. at 535. It should be noted that in considering these effects, the
underlying issue was whether or not the Court's holding that the Fifth
Amendment's protection against double jeopardy is applicable to juvenile

The Court considered the situation in which a fitness hearing is
held prior to any jurisdictional hearing, but the juvenile judge decides to retain the juvenile within the juvenile system.4 5 The effect
of such a situation would be that the juvenile judge who heard
the fitness hearing would not be allowed to hear the jurisdictional
hearing.46 The state argued that the Court's holding could result
in an extra burden upon the juvenile process because more judges
would be required to hear jurisdictional hearings when the above
situation occurs. In response to this contention, the Court set forth
a guideline by stating: ".

.

. the nature of the evidence considered

at a transfer hearing may in some states require that, if transfer
'47
is rejected, a different judge preside at the adjudicatory hearing.
The Court continued by noting that in some jurisdictions 48 a minor
may waive the requirement that a new judge be appointed for the
jurisdictional hearing where the juvenile has been retained after
a fitness hearing. It indicated that a waiver of the "new judge"
requirement was very practical because:
A juvenile will ordinarily not want to dismiss a judge who has refused to transfer him to a criminal court. There is a risk of having
another judge assigned to the case who is not as sympathetic.
Moreover, in many cases, a rapport has been established between
the judge and the juvenile,
and the goal of rehabilitation is well
49
on its way to being met.
In balancing the interests of the juvenile and the state, the Court

considered a study5 ° dealing with the juvenile court system and
recognized that the ".

.

. juvenile courts, perhaps even more than

most courts, suffer from problems created by spiraling caseloads
unaccompanied by enlarged resources and manpower."' ' Based on
the above study, the Court stated that it would be hesitant to improceedings would detrimentally impede the juvenile court's unique characteristics of flexibility, individuality and informality due to the resulting requirement of a fitness hearing prior to any jurisdictional hearing.

45. Id. at 535-536.
46. The basis for this conclusion derives from In re Gladys R., 1 Cal.
3d 855, 464 P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970), in which the Supreme Court
of California held that a juvenile judge cannot read a probation officer's

report prior to a jurisdictional hearing. The result was that if a juvenile
judge, in considering the relevant evidence during a detention hearing, re-

viewed a probation officer's report, a new and different judge would have
to be assigned to hear the jurisdictional hearing, unless such requirement
was waived by the juvenile.
47. 421 U.S. at 536.
48. Id. at 539.
49. Id. at 539 n.21.
50. See PREsmENT's COMM. ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
or JUSTIcE, TASK FORcE REPORT:

JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME

7-8 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
51. 421 U.S. at 537, citing TASK FORcE REPORT, supra note 50.

Breed v. Jones
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pose upon the juvenile system any

"...

additional requirements

which could so strain [its] resources as to endanger its unique functions. '52 However, it felt that the state's argument regarding additional burdens due to a shortage of judges was neither ".

.

. 'quali-

tatively or quantitatively' sufficient to justify a departure. . . from
the fundamental prohibition against double jeopardy. '53 The Court
concluded that the requirement of having a fitness hearing prior
to a jurisdictional hearing may create some "scheduling problems"
in those cases in which the judge retains a juvenile within the system; however, this inconvenience would not have any effect upon
the juvenile court's unique characteristics of individual treatment,
flexibility and informality.
The Court also considered the effect its holding would have in
those jurisdictions 4 where a finding of probable cause is required
before a transfer to the criminal system is permitted. In such jurisdictions, it is possible that where a fitness hearing is held prior
to the jurisdictional hearing and the juvenile is retained within the
juvenile process, the result would be duplicative proceedings because the juvenile court would be reconsidering the same evidence.5 5 In considering this situation, the Court stated that it had
never prescribed any ".

.

. criteria for, or the nature and quantum

of evidence that must support, a decision to transfer a juvenile for
trial in adult court." 50 The Court held that the only requirement
it was placing on the juvenile system by its holding was that:
[A] state determine whether it wants to treat a juvenile within
the juvenile court system before entering upon a proceeding that
may result in an adjudication that he has violated a criminal law
and in a substantial deprivation of liberty, rather than subject him
to the expense,
delay, strain and embarrassment of two such pro57
ceedings.

In further support of its reasoning, the Court again referred to
various studies which dealt with the juvenile court system. In considering these studies, the Court emphasized the extent to which
the protection against double jeopardy had already been made ap52. 421 U.S. at 537.
53. Id.

54. Id. at 536 n.16.
55. Id. at 536.
56. Id. at 537.
57. Id. at 537-538.

plicable to delinquency proceedings in the various states.58 The
Court made reference to a study" which indicated that a ". . . large
number of jurisdictions ...presently require that the transfer decision be made prior to an adjudicatory hearing."8 0 The study found
an absence ". . . of any indication that the juvenile courts in those
jurisdictions have not been able to perform their task within that
framework."6 1 The Court concluded that having a fitness hearing
prior to a jurisdictional hearing would have no detrimental effect
on the nature of the jurisdictional proceedings.
The Court weighed the effect its holding would have on those
who recommend transfer or participate in the process leading to
transfer, namely the probation officers. The requirement of having
a fitness hearing prior to the jurisdictional hearing would mean
that the probation officers would have to complete their investigations and make their recommendations earlier than usual.6 2 The
Court, in reliance upon certain studies,63 held that it had ". . . no
reason to believe that the resources available to those who recommend transfer or participate in the process leading to transfer decisions are inadequate to enable them to gather information relevant to informed decision prior to an adjudicatory hearing. '6 4
The Court, in weighing all of the above effects upon the juvenile
system, concluded that the granting of the protection against double
jeopardy to juveniles within the juvenile process would not have
any substantial detrimental effect on the unique characteristics of
the juvenile process.
In summary, the Court found that the purpose for the protection
against double jeopardy is to prevent the accused from having to
undergo the risk of experiencing the physiological trauma, stress,
embarrassment and expense of a criminal trial twice for the same
offense, and that the juvenile and the adult experience the same
risks and consequences, regardless of the system in which they are
58. Id. at 538. See Double Jeopardy in Juvenile Proceedings, 14 WM.
L. REV. 266, 275.
59. 421 U.S. at 538 n.19, citing Double Jeopardy in Juvenile Proceedings,
14 WM. & MARY L. REV.at 299-300.
60. 421 U.S. at 538.
61. Id.
62. A probation officer's recommendations are usually made at the dispositional hearing. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 702 (West 1972)
which provides that prior to hearing evidence on the proper disposition to
& MARY

be made of the minor, the court ".

.

. may continue the hearing, if neces-

sary, to receive the social study of the probation officer ......
63. See Double Jeopardy in Juvenile Proceedings, 14 WM. & MARY L.
REv.at 305-306.

64. 421 U.S. at 539.

[VoL. 3: 407, 1976]
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prosecuted. In weighing the effects of having a fitness hearing
prior to the jurisdictional hearing in order to prevent double jeopardy, the Court considered such matters as judicial scheduling, duplicative proceedings and probation investigations, and found that
its holding would not have any substantial detrimental or impeding
effects upon the juvenile court system's unique characteristics of
individual treatment, confidentiality, flexibility, and informality.
The Court held that a juvenile is entitled to the Fifth Amendment's
protection against double jeopardy and that such jeopardy will attach when the juvenile court, as the trier of fact, begins to hear
evidence. The result is that all fitness hearings must be held prior
to any jurisdictional hearing if such jeopardy is to be avoided.
The Court applied its three-prong approach and made the above
conclusions, but it continued its opinion by discussing two additional matters, i.e., the concept of continuing jeopardy and a practical aspect of the case which it labeled "the dilemma".
The concept of "continuing jeopardy", relied upon by both the
California Court of Appeals65 and the United States District Court,66

was espoused by Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in Kempner v. United States,6 7 in which he stated:
It is more pertinent to observe that it seems to me that logically
and rationally a man cannot be said to be more than once put in
jeopardy in the same cause, however often he may be tried. The
jeopardy is one
continuing jeopardy, from its beginning to the end
68
of the cause.

65. In re Gary Steven J., 17 Cal. App. 3d 704, 95 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1971).
The Court, in denying the writ of habeas corpus, stated:
In the situation before us, while it is true that, under the language
of Richard M., jeopardy attached once the first witness had testified
at the 701 hearing, no new jeopardy has arisen by the proceedings
sending the case to the criminal court. The entire juvenile court
law contemplates a careful determination, on a case-by-case basis,
as to the type of procedure most likely to protect society and to
rehabilitate the minor. Under some circumstances, a minor will go
from the criminal court to the juvenile court; in other cases he will
go from the juvenile court to the criminal court. But, until one
court or the other reaches a final disposition of the case, only a
single jeopardy is involved.
In re Gary Steven J. supra at 710, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 189. [Emphasis supplied]
66. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
67. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
68. Id. at 134. The "continuing jeopardy concept", as it relates to the

adult criminal system, arises when the state alleges error at trial after the

Even though Holmes is often quoted for the above concept, it

9
was originally developed by the Court in United States v. Ball,6

a case in which the Court refused to accept the view that the Double
Jeopardy Clause prevented a second trial when an earlier conviction
had been set aside. The Court in Price v. Georgia,70 addressing
itself to the Ball opinion, stated that because of that opinion, it
had ".

.

. effectively formulated a concept of continuing jeopardy

that has application where criminal proceedings against an accused
71
have not run their full course."
The concept, as applied to juveniles, would require the conclusion
that once jeopardy attaches in a juvenile proceeding, it continues
until such proceedings have run their full course to a final disposition of the case, whether that disposition be in the juvenile system
or in the criminal system. 72 The Supreme Court in Breed noted
that Holmes's view ".

of the Court.

'7 8

.

. has never been adopted by the majority

The Court felt that the state's reasoning, that

jury has rendered a verdict of "not guilty". According to Holmes's view,
the state would be allowed to appeal such errors even though the defendant
had been acquitted by the jury. The Court in United States v. Wilson, 420
U.S. 332 (1975), interpreted Holmes's view as follows:
[Iln his view, the first jeopardy should be treated as continuing
until both sides have exhausted their appeals on claimed errors of
law, regardless of the possibility that the defendant may be subjected to retrial after a verdict of acquittal.
420 U.S. at 352.
69. 163 U.S. 662 (1896). The Court in Breed makes a distinction between the "concept" and the "conclusion" of continuing double jeopardy.
The distinction appears to be vital. Under the concept of continuing double
jeopardy, according to Holmes's view, the government would be allowed
to appeal alleged errors at trial, even though the defendant had been
acquitted. The underlying rationale for such an approach appears to be
that both sides should be allowed to exhaust their appellate remedies. In
contrast, the "conclusion" of continuing double jeopardy, approved by the
Court, is that the defendant's jeopardy continues until the defendant is
acquitted or his conviction becomes final. See U.S. v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332,
343-44 n.11. Once the defendant is acquitted, the jury's verdict of "not
guilty" renders the defendant's jeopardy final, and even though there may
have been errors at trial, the government is precluded from appeal.
70. 398 U.S. 323 (1970).
71. Id. at 326.

72. See supra note 66 and 15.

73. 421 U.S. at 534. The Court cites United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S.
358, at 369 (1975) for its statement, but the reasoning behind such statement appears in United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, at 352 (1975):
[W]e have rejected Holmes's continuing jeopardy concept in the
past, and we continue to be of the view that the policies underlying
the Double Jeopardy Clause militate against permitting the Government to appeal after a verdict of acquittal. Granting the Government broad appeal rights would allow the prosecutor to seek
to persuade a second trier of fact of the defendant's guilt after
having failed with the first; it would permit him to re-examine the
weaknesses in his first presentation in order to strengthen the sec-
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Jones was never placed in double jeopardy because the proceedings
against him had not run their full course within the contemplation
of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, was an insufficient
explanation for why Jones should be deprived of protection against
double jeopardy.7 4 It is clear that the concept of continuing jeopardy, as applied to juveniles, is disapproved by the Court.
Before making its final order, the Court addressed itself to one
"practical problem" which emphasized the need for the Court's
holding. The Court labeled this problem "the dilemma". The
dilemma was the ".

.

. possibility that a juvenile, since he is in the

juvenile process, might think he is the 'beneficiary of special consideration' .

. . ."

and yet ".

.

. may in fact suffer substantial dis-

advantages. '75 The Court was referring to the situation in which
a juvenile, if uncooperative in a jurisdictional hearing, may suffer
an adverse adjudication or, if he is uncooperative with his probation
officer, may suffer an unfavorable disposition; yet if a fitness hearing is held after the jurisdictional hearing, and the juvenile has
been cooperative in the jurisdictional hearing, ".

.

. he runs the risk

of prejudicing his chances in adult court if the transfer is or7
dered." 6
An illustration of this dilemma was alluded to by the United
States Court of Appeals. 7 7 In its opinion the Court referred to the
situation in which a juvenile is declared a ward of the court in a
jurisdictional hearing, but subsequently is processed through a fitness hearing in which he is ordered transferred to the adult criminal
system. After such a transfer is ordered, the transcript of the jurisdictional hearing is delivered to the prosecution in the adult criminal system to assist it in prosecuting the juvenile. The Court
recognized that such a procedure would give the prosecution in the
adult criminal system an unfair advantage in that it would allow
the prosecution to review in advance of trial the strong and weak
areas of the juvenile's case in addition to his defense. The Court of
Appeals found such procedure ".

.

. offensive to the concepts of

ond; and it would disserve the defendant's legitimate interest in
the finality of a verdict of acquittal.

74. 421 U.S. at 534.
75. Id. at 540.

76. Id.
77. Jones v. Breed, 497 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1974).

basic evenhanded fairness.

'78

The Court of Appeals characterized such procedure "offensive",
and the Supreme Court in Breed found it "....

at odds with the

goal that adjudicatory hearings be informal and non-adversary.
The Court stated:

'7 9

Knowledge of the risk of transfer after an adjudicatory hearing can
only undermine the potential for informality and cooperation which
was intended to be the hallmark of the juvenile court system.8 0

The Court concluded that if the jurisdictional hearing were held
prior to the fitness hearing, such a procedure would force the juvenile and his counsel into the role of adversary, in that the juvenile
would have to protect his interests because of the possibility that
he might be transferred to the adult criminal system even after
his adjudication.8 ' To alleviate this dilemma and to achieve the
foundational goal of the juvenile sytem, the Court felt it was necessary to require that a fitness hearing be held prior to any jurisdictional hearing.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Breed v. Jones held that the protection
of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, must be granted to juveniles within the
juvenile process in order to assure them "fundamental fairness".
The Court found that the purpose underlying the Clause was to
prevent the accused from being exposed to the risk of the physiological trauma, stress, embarrassment and expense of a criminal
trial twice for the same offense. The Court found that a juvenile
within the juvenie process suffers the same anxiety and stress as
an adult in the criminal system; therefore, juveniles should be afforded the same protection against double jeopardy as adults.
The effect of granting juveniles protection against double jeopardy will require that the juvenile courts afford juveniles a fitness
hearing prior to any j urisdictonal hearing because jeopardy attaches
at the moment evidence is first heard during the jurisdictional hearing. Such a requirement will have an effect on the procedures
within the juvenile courts; judges who hear a fitness hearing prior
to a jurisdictional hearing will not be able to hear the subsequent
78. Id. at 1168.

79. 421 U.S. at 540.
80. Id. at 540-41.
81. Id. at 540.
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jurisdictional hearing if the juvenile is retained within the system,
unless the "new judge" requirement is waived by the juvenile, and
those involved in making recommendations of transfer will be required to make their investigations and recommendations earlier
than usual. Regardless of the above, the Court concluded that these
effects were not sufficient to deprive a juvenile of his constitutional
right to protection against twice being placed in jeopardy because,
practically speaking, they have no real impact upon the flexibility,
individuality, and informality which characterize the juvenile process.
Breed has articulated adequate guidelines for many of the problems which may result from its holding; but there is one area to
which it neglected to direct its attention. The neglected area is
that of the California Youth Authority. Section 707 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code provides:
[Alt any time after such [jurisdictional] hearing, a minor who
was 16 years of age or older at the time of the commission of an
offense and who was committed therefor by the court to the Youth
Authority, is returned to the court by the Youth Authority pursuant
to Section 780 or 1737.1, the court may make a finding noted in
the minutes of the court that the minor is not a fit and proper sub82
ject to be dealt with under this chapter ....

Sections 78083 and 1737.184 provide, in effect, that if the juvenile
82. Stats. 1961, c. 1616, p. 3485 § 2, as amended CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE § 707 (West Supp. 1975). For the complete text, see supra note 9.
83. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 780 (West 1972):
If any person who has been committed to the Youth Authority appears to be an improper person to be received by or retained in
any institution or facility under the jurisdiction of the Youth Authority or to be so incorrigible or so incapable of reformation under
the discipline of any institution or facility under the jurisdiction
of the Youth Authority as to render his retention detrimental to
the interests of the Youth Authority, the Youth Authority may return such person to the committing court. However, the return of
any person to the committing court does not relieve the Youth Authority of any of its duties or responsibilities under the original
commitment, and such commitment continues in full force and effect until it is vacated, modified, or set aside by order of the court.
84. See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 1737.1 (West 1972):
Whenever any person who has been charged with or convicted of
a public offense and committed to the authority appears to the authority, either at the time of his presentation or after having become an inmate of any institution or facility subject to the jurisdiction of the authority, to be an improper person to be retained in
any such institution or facility, or to be so incorrigible or so incapable of reformation under the discipline of the authority as to ren-

is an improper person to be received or retained by the Youth Authority, it may return him to the committing court for further disposition. Breed's effect upon the above terminology in Section 707
will be to nullify it because the statutory language assumes that
the juvenile committed to the Youth Authority has already been
processed through a jurisdictional hearing. If the Youth Authority
returned the juvenile to the juvenile court under Section 780 or
1737.1 and the Court found the juvenile unfit under Section 707
and ordered him transferred to the adult criminal system for prosecution, such prosecution, according to Breed, would amount to
double jeopardy.
As to Sections 780 and 1737.1, Breed has an indirect effect. The
Youth Authority can still return the juvenile to the committing
court, but under such circumstances, in light of Breed, the committing court can only render an alternative disposition or return the
juvenile to the Youth Authority because Breed precludes the committing court from transferring the juvenile to the adult criminal
system when confronted with the above situation.
One might ask if there are other alternatives available to
Youth Authority when dealing with an unamenable juvenile
sides returning him to the committing court. An affirmative
swer may be found in Section 1753 of the California Welfare
Institutions Code, which provides:

the
beanand

For purposes of carrying out its duties, the Authority and the di-

rector are authorized to make use of law enforcement, detention,

probation, parole, medical, education, correctional, segregative and
other facilities, institutions and agencies, whether public or private,
within the State. The director may enter into agreements with the
appropriate public officials for separate care and special treatment
der his detention detrimental to the interests of the authority and
the other persons committed thereto, the authority may return him
to the committing court. In the case of a person convicted of a
public offense, said court may then commit him to a state prison
or sentence him to a county jail as provided by law for punishment
of the offense of which he was convicted. The maximum term of
imprisonment for a person committed to a state prison under this
section shall be a period equal to the maximum term prescribed
by the law for the offense of which he was convicted less the period
during which he was under the control of the Youth Authority.
The Adult Authority may, after seeking the advice of the Youth
Authority, allow any such person time credit reductions from his
term of confinement according to the table set forth in Section 2920
of the Penal Code for the time during which such person was under
the control of the Youth Authority. In the case of a person who
has been committed to the authority by a juvenile court, the juvenile court to which he is returned may make such further order
or commitment with reference to such person as may be authorized
by the juvenile court law, except that said court may not recommit
such person to the Youth Authority.
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in existing institutions of persons subject to the control of the Authority. 85 [Emphasis supplied]

In People v. Scherbing,8 6 the California Court of Appeals held
that Section 1753 empowers the Youth Authority to ". . . use all
state institutions, including prisons, for any person within its control .
*...
"87 The Court concluded that the Youth Authority has
the power to transfer juveniles to San Quentin. If the effects of

Breed bring about this result, it might be arguable that such action
would constitute a deprivation of liberty without procedural due
process of law in that the juvenile is being treated as an adult criminal, while never receiving the same criminal procedural safeguards
afforded to adult criminals, such as the right to a jury trial.
The Court in Breed found the lack of double jeopardy "at odds"
with the juvenile system's goal of "fundamental fairness". However, if the above hypothetical situation becomes a reality, juveniles
will suffer a substantial harm until the courts have the occasion
to declare the Youth Authority's action with regard to "correctional" facilities of Section 1753 unconstitutional or the State legislature takes remedial action to alleviate this situation.

JERE LAMONT FOX

85. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 1753 (West 1972).
86. 93 Cal. App. 2d 736, 209 P.2d 796 (1949). In Scherbing, the appellant
was committed to San Quentin by the Youth Authority under California
Welfare and Institutions Code § 1753. The appellant was charged, while in
San Quentin, with violating CAL. PENAL CODE § 4502 (West 1949) which
provides:

Every prisoner committed to a State prison who, while at such

State prison. . . possesses or carries upon his person ... any dirk
or dagger or sharp instrument .... is guilty of a felony and shall
be punished by imprisonment in a state prison for a term not less
than five (5) years.
The appellant's basic contention was that "...
he was not lawfully committed to San Quentin, and that only one who has been lawfully committed
to a state prison can violate section 4502." Id. at 738, 209 P.2d at 798.
87. Id. at 740, 209 P.2d at 798. This holding was approved by the California Supreme Court in In re Cathey, 55 Cal. 2d 679, 689 n.5, 12 Cal. Rptr.
762, 766 n.5, 361 P.2d 426, 430 n.5 (1961).

